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ALL THINGS IN PROPORTION? AMERICAN RIGHTS
REVIEW AND THE PROBLEM OF BALANCING
Jud Mathews
Alec Stone Sweet
ABSTRACT
This Article describes and evaluates the evolution of rights doctrine in the
United States, focusing on the problem of balancing. In the current Supreme
Court, deep conflict over whether, when, and how courts balance rights is
omnipresent. Elsewhere, we find that the world's most powerful constitutional
courts have embraced a stable analyticalprocedurefor balancing, known as
proportionality. Today, proportionalityanalysis (PA) constitutes the defining
doctrinalcore of a transnational,rights-basedconstitutionalism. This Article
critically examines alleged American exceptionalism,from the standpoint of
comparative constitutional law and practice. Part I provides an overview of
how constitutionaljudges in other systems use PA, assesses the costs and
benefits of adopting it, and contrasts proportionality with American strict
scrutiny. Part II recovers the foundations of proportionality in American
rights review, focusing on two critical junctures: (1) the emergence of a
version of PA in dormant Commerce Clause doctrine in the late nineteenth
century, the core of which persists today; and (2) the consolidationof the strict
scrutiny framework in the mid-twentieth century. Part III demonstrates that
the "tiered review" regime chronically produces pathologies that have
weakened rights protection in the United States and undermined the coherence
of the Supreme Court's rights jurisprudence. PA, while not a cure-allfor the
challenges faced by rights-protecting courts, avoids these pathologies by
providing a relatively systematic, transparent,and trans-substantive doctrinal
structurefor balancing. We also show that all three levels of review-rational
basis, intermediatereview, and strict scrutiny-have, at various points in their
evolution, contained core elements of proportionality. In Part IV we argue
that the Supreme Court can and should cultivate a version of PA rooted in
American constitutionaltraditions and values.
Visiting Assistant Professor, University of Illinois College of Law.
Leitner Professor of Law, Politics, and International Studies, Yale Law School. The authors would
like to thank participants in the Yale Law School faculty workshop for helpful comments on a draft of this
paper.

